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Compassion Compass Group

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Michael Adams
Michael Adams

Terror In The Woods [WORK]


They went to discover the great outdoors, but something discovered them first. "Terror in the Woods" features real stories of people who embarked on a wilderness adventure only to be scared out of the woods by unexplained phenomena.




Terror in the Woods


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Prior to the terrorist attack on September 11, 2001, the focus of the U.S. government, in terms of homeland security, was on national missile defense or international aviation, not on the vulnerability of its ports. This lack of effective port security existed despite the radical change that had taken place in international shipping with the advent of containerization and the attendant rise of a global economy. In 2000, the warnings of the Interagency Commission on Crime and Security in U.S. Ports (the "Commission"), that "U.S. seaports are vulnerable to terrorist attacks, and such attacks have the potential to create substantial damage to seaport infrastructure, with significant national security consequences," went unheeded. The U.S. government also ignored the Commission's additional conclusion that "threats of chemical or biological assault could represent an emerging issue for national infrastructure systems such as seaports" and its recommendation "that minimum port security guidelines should be developed" in line with its findings. Just two months before the attacks on 9/11, the Acting Deputy Administrator of the U.S. Department of Transportation, Maritime Administration ("MARAD") echoed the Commission's report while testifying before the Senate Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation. He noted that unlike "U.S. airports and land border crossings [that] have well-structured security measures, our ports do not enjoy the same level of security even though they offer unparalleled intermodal access to our nation's interior." Irrespective of such warnings, prior to the attack on the World Trade Center, the goals of port security were primarily to prevent cargo theft, counteract drug smuggling, and control any stowaway problems. After the Introduction in Part I, Part II of this Article provides a brief, historical overview of the major U.S. port security regulations prior to 9/11. It then touches briefly on the two key pieces of legislation relevant to container security, the Maritime Transportation and Security Act of 2002 (the "MTSA") and the Security and Accountability For Every ("SAFE") Port Act. Next, it will examine the success and failure of three primary, post-9/11, domestic, container-specific security measures taken to increase port security: the Container Security Initiative (the "CSI"), the 100% cargo scanning rule, and the C-TPAT. It will also address the required biometric credential pursuant to the Transportation Worker Identification Credential ("TWIC"). Part III traces the rise of the shipping container and discusses certain unique cargo security issues resulting from the expansion of containerization. Part IV then considers the potential of terrorist stowaways to breach current port security measures and threaten national security. In concluding, Part V will make some suggestions about the course the United States might want to chart in its ongoing effort to ensure the security of the nation's seaports from the dangers that terrorist compromised cargo containers pose.


Keywords: Cargo, shipping container, containerization, terrorist attack, terrorism, September 11, 9/11, Interagency Commission on Crime and Security, the Commission, U.S. Department of Transportation, Maritime Administration, MARAD, Senate Committee on Commerce, Transportation, chemical assault, biological 041b061a72


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